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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA SIMS LORD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. No. 19167 
DAVID GEORGE LORD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF 
POINT I 
APPELLANT CANNOT CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF JUDGE JONES' 
SANCTION FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS REPLY BRIEF 
On page 1 of his reply brief, Appellant now 
contends that one of the key issues for this Court to 
consider is a series of findings and a sanction, pursuant to 
Rule 37, U.R.C.P., entered by Judge Maurice D. Jones in 
March of 1982. (Appellant's Reply Brief, hereinafter ARB at 
l; cf. Record, Volume I, hereinafter I, at 158-59) Neither 
Appellant's notice of appeal nor "his brief on appeal, 
however, even mentioned this order. (See Record, Volume II, 
hereinafter II at 178; Appellant's Brief) . Thus, 
A[Jpellant' s notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 73A, 
11. R. C. P., makes no mention of anything but the Supplemental 
D~cree and Judgment Pertaining to Distribution of Property, 
which was entered after nonjury trial on January 19th, 1983 
and filed on January 31st, 1983. (See II at 152). And in 
Appellant's initial brief on appeal no mention was made of 
Judge Jones' earlier order n'qarcling sanctions. !laving 
failed to raise in his initial brief the validity of this 
sanction, Appellant has specifically abandoned any objection 
to it. (See Armstrong Rubber Company v. Bastian, 667 P.2d 
1346 (Utah 1983). While Appellant choses to raise the issue 
of the order's validity in his reply brief, the Respondent 
choses to simply note to the Court that this issue has been 
waived, and the only real point of argument might be the 
EFFECT of Judge Jones' order, BUT NOT ITS VALIDITY. While 
Appellant now states that the inequity of the sanction is a 
key issue for the Court to consider, he has failed to either 
procedurally or substantively imbue the Court with any real 
authority to review the validity of this sanction. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF BOLDLY CREATES A FACTUAL 
SITUATION WITHOUT CITATION TO THE RECORD OR SUPPORT 
IN THE EVIDENCE 
The Appellant laboriously seeks to have this Court 
find the trial proceedings "inequitable" and the equities of 
Title 30 of the Utah Code to "have been sorely violated" by 
the district court judges who heard this case over a period 
of two and one-half years at the lower level. (ARB at 1-2) 
Appellant states that his nonappearance at trial was because 
in filing a notice of appeal from an interlocutory order, he 
incorrectly felt that the trial proceedinqs were stayed. 
(ARB at 2) Appellant once again states that he had a right 
2 
to appeal, but indeed, Appellant's counsel, in his second 
attempt to appeal an interlocutory matter, filed a notice as 
1 t the order denying venue were final in nature. (See 
Respondent's Brief, hereinafter RB at 30-31). It had long 
been settled under Utah law that there is !!.£ right of direct 
appeal in this jurisdiction from an order granting or 
refusing a change of venue. (See Hale v. Barker, 70 Utah 
284, 259 P. 928 (1927); see also II, document immediately 
preceding R-178). Consequently, the notice of appeal from 
the interlocutory order had no effect on the trial court's 
continuing jurisdiction to hear the matter. (See RB at 
Point VII}. Appellant could have petitioned this Court for 
a discretionary review under Rule 72(b), U.R.C.P. He failed 
to do so! 
Appellant further claims that an nonparty witness, 
Mr. Anthony Thurber, misled his counsel as to Mr. Thurber's 
intent to attend trial. Mr. Thurber was under subpoena. In 
arguing this matter, Appellant attempts to bring before the 
Court extraneous, self-serving affidavits alleging that Mr. 
Thurber advised him that he was not attending trial. Mr. 
Thurber has previously filed with this Court contrary 
affidavits attached to the Respondent's brief. Furthermore, 
attached to this reply brief is the affidavit of Carolyn 
Lockett, who, under oath, has stated that she distinctly 
heard Mr. Thurber advise Mr. Stanton that he would be 
attending trial at least three times on January 18th, 1983. 
Mr. Thurber, again, was under subpoena, and there is no 
reason to believe that he would have disobeyed the same, 
Respondent's counsel always understood Mr. Thurher was 
obeying the subpoena, and was !:!_ever n.uvised by Appedlant's 
counsel that neither he nor the Appellant would attend 
trial. 
POINT III 
RHETORICAL ALLEGATIONS AND QUESTIONS PHRASED TO THE 
COURT WITHOUT CITATION TO THE RECORD NOR ANY 
EVIDENTIARY BASIS PRECLUDE ANY APPELLATE REVIEW 
Appellant's reply brief creates a version of "the 
facts" without any support in the record, and certainly 
without any support in a trial transcript which is not part 
of the record on appeal. In this ambient, the Utah Supreme 
Court must logically assume the correctness of the trial 
court's judgment, absent appropriate citation to the record 
and a transcript of trial which would invite reversal. 
(See, ~' State v. Stegel, 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983). 
While the Stegel decision pertains particularly to Rule 
75 (p) (2) (2) (d), U.R.C.P., the thrust of the decision is that 
allegations of fact should contain citation to the pages in 
the record where they are appropriately supported. In 
Appellant's reply brief, once again he creates a 
self-serving statement of facts to invite judicial review 
without citation to the record. Exemplary of Appellant's 
technique is the following excerpt from page 3 of his reply 
brief: 
Anthony Thurber's tPstimony as to notariziny 
the Quit Claim Deed for friends is contrary to 
fact. Anthony Thurber acted in the capacity of 
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Attorney for Defendant in the matter of 
pre-divorce property settlement and initially 
represented Defendant in this divorce matter. Mr. 
Thurber's testimony is one of vindictiveness and 
conspiracy and can so be proven on remand. 
According to the record and Plaintiff's 
brief, the trial held on January 19, 1983 was 
solely for the purpose of martial property 
division. The divorce had been granted in a 
previous trial on May 28, 1982. The Defendant was 
granted a divorce from the Plaintiff on the 
grounds of adultry [sic] a,nd the Plaintiff was 
granted a divorce from the Defendant on the 
grounds of Mental Cruelty. Plaintiff was five (5) 
months pregnant at the time of the Divorce Trial. 
The Court may also want to note that Plaintiff and 
her paramour were married on the afternoon of May 
28, 1982. 
It is apparent by the record that Plaintiff's 
counsel and witness, Anthony Thurber embarked upon 
an assassination of the Defendant at the January 
19, 1983 trial. Why else would Plaintiff's 
exhibits P-8 through P-21 be sealed by the Court. 
Domestic matters are equitable in and where 
the evidence at the Trial Court clearly 
preponderates against the Findings of Facts, the 
Supreme Court can reverse those findings. 
How can the Trial Court find that Defendant's 
business generates $35,000.00 annually without 
Defendant's business records? The Plaintiff was 
certainly not competent to testify. Defendant and 
Plaintiff had been separated for a period of 
fifteen months at the time of trial and had been 
separated on ten pervious [sic] occasions. 
Plaintiff's brief states that she was employed 
full time from the start of the marriage outside 
of Defendant's business. 
How can a Trial Court find that Plaintiff is 
entitled to attorney's fees when she is carrying 
another man's child and had granted the Defendant 
a divorce on the grounds of adultry [sic]? In 
fact, Plaintiff's counsel told Defendant's counsel 
that he was not going to get a penny for his fees 
unless he was able to get the marital home for the 
Plaintiff. See copy of letter attached hereto as 
Annex "B" and incorporated herein by reference. 
In response to the above, Mr. Thurber's testimony 
is not before this Court, because Appellant chose not to 
lld\'<? a transcript of the same made available. Appellant 
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notes that he filed a certificate that the transcript had 
been ordered, but in point of fact Mr. Byron Ray 
Christiansen, the certified shorthand rrporter at the trial, 
has never been contacted by Mr. Stanton, by Mr. Stanton's 
secretary, by Mr. Stanton's paralegal, or by anybody 
representing or acting on behalf of Mr. Lord or Mr. Stanton 
to make a transcript of the trial in this case! An 
affidavit of Mr. Christiansen indicating that no transcript 
was ever ordered by him is attached to this brief. Indeed, 
it is the Appellant's not the Respondent's duty to assure 
that a trial transcript is made available to the appellate 
tribunal. (See Rule 75(b) U.R.C.P.). In the instant case, 
Appellant's counsel filed a certificate with the court, 
pursuant to Rule 75(a) (1) U.R.C.P. indicating that he had 
ordered a transcript from the court reporter. This 
certificate is attached to Appellant's reply brief, but the 
certificate flies in the face of the following two facts: 
(1) Mr. Byron Ray Christiansen, court reporter, was indeed 
not contacted by anyone in reference to the preparation of a 
trial transcript for purposes of this appeal, and thus did 
not prepare one; and (2) there is no trial transcript before 
this Court, and Appellant has chosen to take his appeal 
alleging extraneous facts without the benefit of one. 
Appellant's statement about the Respondent's 
remarriage are unknown to Respondent's counsel. They, 
again, are not part of the record. Respondent is more than 
happy to have Exhibits P-8 through P-21 received by this 
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Court, should Appellant so desire. Appellant's reply 
brief's statement that Respondent has stated she was 
"employed full time from the start of the marriage outside 
of Defendant's business" is simply untrue. (See ARB at 3) 
Indeed, the Respondent's brief states that Respondent worked 
substantially full-time throughout the term of her marriage, 
but indicates that whatever remuneration the Respondent 
received from working within the family business was used to 
pay household expenses and supply the other temporal needs 
of the marriage. (See RB at 6; ~ also II at 145, ~s 3 and 
4). Lastly, Appellant's counsel now makes extraneous 
allegations pertaining ·to Respondent's fee agreement with 
her counsel, and as authority therefor cites Appellant's 
counsel's own self-serving letter which he appends as an 
exhibit to his brief. While Respondent's fee agreement has 
not been put before this Court for appellate review, 
Respondent's counsel, as an officer of the Court, 
gladly certify that he is working on a standard 
basis. 
would 
hourly 
The trial court clearly had the equitable power t0 
divide up the marital property, including the marital home. 
To rhetorically ask "how can this be done" is to blindly 
ignore the thrust of Title 30 of the Utah Code as 
long-construed by the Supreme Court. A reimbursement of 
monies advanced to the family business with the award of the 
remainder of the business to the Appellant does not violate 
the statute of frauds, as the statute of frauds is not 
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involved in considering these equitable divisions of Jointly 
held or jointly operated property. 
Ultimately, l\pp<>llant ar<Jues tltal the entire 
proceedings bely unfairness to his client, particularly in 
requiring him to defend a matter three hundred miles from 
his home. Venue, however, was proper in Washington County, 
and any objection to venue came over a year and a half after 
the initial complaint and responsive pleadings were filed in 
this case. 
The Appellant states: 
A court must consider all 
without bias, prejudice or 
party in making its decision. 
the pertinent facts 
disadvantage to one 
AB at 5. 
The Appellant, however, has chosen to argue on the basis of 
assertions without foundation in the record and on the basis 
of innuendo pertaining to the attendance of a nonparty 
witness. The Appellant seeks a reversal in this case on the 
basis of purely speculative allegations. He no doubt seeks 
to argue these allegations as if the same were before this 
Court. He brings his appeal without a transcript of trial 
and states that the Respondent's argument that he has never 
ordered the complete records of the trial proceedings is 
incorrect, attaching his certificate regarding the 
transcript as Appendix C to his reply brief. This belies 
the fact, however, that the court reporter was never 
contacted in this case regarding a transcript for purposc'c 
of appeal, and the appeal, in L:ict, has been perfected 
before this Court without the benefit of a trial transcript. 
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It is simply not part of the record, and absent the trial 
transcript the Appellant's factual allegations comprise 
little more than errant pipe dreams of what Appellant wishes 
the facts might be. 
Lastly, Appellant offers no response to Point VIII 
of Respondent's brief, to-wit, that there has been no timely 
perfection of an appeal in this case. Thus, to reverse the 
trial court judgment invites little more than rampant 
speculation as to the veracity of Appellant's allegations. 
Indeed, Appellant's invitation to reverse the trial court 
comes before this Court absent any trial transcript, and, 
furthermore, absent any proper and timely p~rfected notice 
of appeal. As stated in Respondent's brief, the last order 
of the trial court denying the Appellant's motion to vacate 
the trial court's judgment is docketed with the district 
court on March 21st, 1983. (See II at 176) The notice of 
appeal, however, in the instant case, was not properly 
docketed until April 25th, 1983. (See II at 178) By reason 
of Appellant's sheer delay in filing his motion to vacate, 
the appeal time in the instant case actually ran and expired 
on February 28th, 1983. (See RB at Point VIII, pp. 65-69) 
Viewed from any angle, however, the Appellant has failed to 
perfect an appeal. His cacaphonic rumblings should not now 
lnvite either judicial attention or deference. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~J/o,f: day of Au9ust, 
1984. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ---~~~- day of August, 
1984, I mailed two true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF to D. Aron Stanton at 255 
East 400 South, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, 
postage prepaid. 
/ 
__,,. 
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A P P E N D I X 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTA!! 
REBECCA SIMS LORD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID GEORGE LORD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake 
AFFIDAVIT OF CAROLYN 
LOCKETT 
No. 19167 
CAROLYN LOCKETT, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am a secretary in the offices of Anthony M. 
Thurber, attorney in Salt Lake City. 
2. I have reviewed the affidavit of Anthony M. 
Thurber previously filed before this Court and attached 
hereto as Exhibit A, indicating that Mr. Thurber advised Mr. 
Stanton that he would be attending trial on the above matter 
on January 19th, 1983. 
3. I have reviewed Mr. Stanton's statement in 
his brief that on January 18th, 1983, Mr. Thurber advised 
him that he would not be in attendance at trial the next 
day. 
4. On January 18th, 1983, Mr. Thurber invited me 
into his office with the express understanding that I was to 
uvechear Mr. Thurber in his conversation with Mr. Stanton. 
5. On that day, to-wit, approximately one day 
prior to trial, Mr. Thurber repeatedly told Mr. Stanton, and 
in no case less than three times, that he had been 
subpoenaed to attend trial, and that he would be attending 
the trial in Washington County, and that Mr. Stanton should 
settle the case, if at all possible, on the best terms he 
could, but again, in any event, Mr. Thurber would indeed be 
attending trial. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this ~-~-'/_J_~~~ day of August, 1984. 
of 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of 
/\uyust, 1984, I mailed c; true and correct copy of the above 
~nd foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF CAROLYN LOCKETT to D. Aron 
\\'031/81-3944 2 
Stanton at 255 East 400 South, Suite 101, s,-ilt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, postage prepaid. 
SECRfTARY 
W031/81-3944 3 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA SIMS LORD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID GEORGE LORD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
County of Washington) 
AFFIDAVIT OF BYRON RAY 
CHRISTI.AN SEN 
No. 19167 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am a certified shorthand reporter in and 
for the State of Utah and the official court reporter of the 
Fifth Judicial District Court comprised of Beaver, Iron and 
Washington counties, and have been such since June 1, 1960 
and at all times therein. 
2. Regarding the above-captioned matter, I have 
never at any time been contacted or requested in any way, 
manner, shape or form by Daniel Aron Stanton to prepare any 
transcript in the above-captioned case. 
FURTHER AFFIANT ~UGHT. 
DATED this f)jj;, day of August, 1984. 
~/-;?._~ · 
day 
of August, 
My Commis 
c:J - -'/, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of 
August, 1984, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN to D. Aron 
Stanton at 255 East 400 South, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111, postage prepaid. 
SECRETARY 
W031/81-3944 
EXHIBIT A 
TJIO:\PSO!l, HUGHES & REBER 
Michael D. Hughes 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
J.18 East Tabernacle 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Telephone: 801/673-4892 
Ill THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA SIMS LORD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID GEORGE LORD, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS. 
County of Salt Lake 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANTHONY 
THURBER 
No. 19167 \ 
ANTHONY THURBER, being first duly sworn, hereby 
deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in 
the State of Utah and have practiced primarily in Salt Lake 
County for well over fifteen years. 
2. This affidavit is based upon my personal 
knowledge ~nd information . 
.l. I was the notary public on a deed attached 
hereto as Exhibit A, and privy to a conversation between the 
Pe sponden t, Hebe cc a S irns Lord, and the Appellant, David 
George Lord, pertaining to the fact that such deed was not 
to be filed in the event the parties stayed toqether t 01 
more than one year, which in fact the parties dict. 
4. I have reviewed the affidavit of Daniel A. 
Stanton, subscribed and sv1orn to on the 31st day of May, 
1983, and filed with this Court. Paragraph 13 of Mr. 
Stanton's affidavit states the following: 
On January 18, 1983 witness for 
plaintiff-respondent, Anthony Thurber, Attorney at 
Law, called our office and asked about the appeal 
that was processed to the Supreme Court on the 
courts order denying defendant-appellants Motion 
for Change of Venue. Upon an affirmative answer 
from af fiant that the District Court had processed 
the appeal, Anthony Thurber then stated that he 
would not appear for trial the following day 
because he felt the Trial Court did not have 
jurisdiction to continue with the Trial until the 
appeal was resolved by the Utah Supreme Court. 
5. The above Paragraph 13 of Mr. Stanton's 
affidavit is not true. 
6. On the 18th day of January, 1983, I spoke 
with Mr. Stanton over the telephone and indicated to him 
that I was under subpoena to appear in the District Court in 
and for Washington County in the case of Lord v. Lord, Civil 
No. 8042. I advised Mr. Stanton that as I was under 
subpoena I was going down to testify as to the invalidity of 
the deed attached hereto as Exhibit A, and I suggested to 
Mr. ~a .. rnlrni lk1L Ile settle his J.:iwo.uit on the best Lenn" 
possible for his client. Mr. Stanton told me that he 
intended to appeu 1, und thi1t he, Mr. StCJnton, was not qnin·1 
to attend the trial. At no time did I tell Mr. Stanton th0i 
I would not appear for trial on the 19th day of January, and 
at no tir:ie did I advise Mr. Stanton that I felt the trial 
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter set 
before it on the 19th day of January. 
7. On the 19th day of January, under subpoena, I 
was sworn and, upon being ordered to testify by the Court, 
did so pursuant to the questioning of Michael D. Hughes, 
attorney for the Plaintiff and Respondent herein, Rebecca 
Sims Lord. 
FURTHf.R AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this ~-c-:-'~~ day of June, 1983. 
-------<::::::-=:::::;? c--;_ -- -- -=:,, 
?ANTHONY THURBER 
Attorney at Law 
SUBSCRIBED AND 
of June, 1983. 
!-'-
SWORN TO before me this }!}____ day 
/-2::-::( 11 c-::L- :· f /':\ 
~CT.\'RY PUBLiy , _/ }-/ _ 
Residing at-- ,// -, ( ,(, ( :Z.a,-, {-
/' My Commission Expires: 
1 Y" b-'-/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certi:'y that on the I ./;( -·, -J day of June, 
1983, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and 
fore>yoing l\FFJDAVIT OF l\NT!!ONY TIIURDF.R to Attorney for 
llclcmliinl, Uuniel A. Stanton, at 431 South 300 East, Suite 
410, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid. 
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